Basic principles of Bayesian statistics and econometrics are reviewed. The topics covered include point and interval estimation, hypothesis testing, prediction, model building and choice of prior. We also review in very general terms recent advances in computational methods and illustrate the use of these techniques with an application.
Introduction
Statistics is the study of uncertainty. The Bayesian paradigm interprets "probability" similarly to ordinary everyday language, i.e., as a measure of "uncertainty" or "degree of belief" associated with the occurrence of a particular uncertain event, given the available information and any accepted assumptions. Degrees of belief can be operationalized into probabilities in terms of reference lotteries. 1 Bayesian statistics prescribes how an individual should act in the face of such uncertainty in order to avoid undesirable inconsistencies. 2 Expected utility maximization (or loss minimization) provides a basis for rational decision making, and Bayes Theorem describes how beliefs evolve as data are obtained. 3 While the descriptive accuracy of the Bayesian approach in capturing the actual behaviors of individuals is questioned by many opponents, Bayesians only claim that the Bayesian view provides normative guidelines for behavior. Bayesian econometrics consists of the tools of Bayesian statistics applicable to economic phenomena.
The subjective interpretation of probability is based on an individual's personal assessment of a situation. Accordingly, probability is a property of an individual's perception of reality, whereas according to objective interpretations, probability is a property of reality itself. For subjectivists there are no "true unknown probabilities" in the world to be discovered. Instead, "probability" is in the eye of the beholder. 4 In de Finetti's words: "Probability does not exist."
Bruno de Finetti assigned a fundamental role in Bayesian analysis to the concept of exchangeability. A finite sequence of events (or random variables) is exchangeable iff the joint probability of the sequence, or any subsequence, is invariant under permutations of the subscripts. An infinite sequence is exchangeable iff any finite subsequence is exchangeable. Exchangeability involves recognizing symmetry in beliefs concerning observables, and presumably this is something about 1 Suppose you seek your degree of belief, denoted p = P r (A) , that an event A occurs. Consider two options: (a) receiving a small reward $r if A occurs, and receiving $0 if A does not occur, and (b) engaging in a lottery in which you win $r with probability p, and receiving $0 with probability 1 − p. If you are indifferent between these two choices, then your degree of belief in A occurring is p. Requiring the reward to be small is to avoid the problem of introducing utility into the analysis, i.e., implicitly assuming utility is linear in money for small gambles.
2 Consider an individual asked to quote probabilities on a set of uncertain events, and required to accept any wagers about these events. According to de Finetti's coherency principle, such an individual should never assign probabilities so that someone else can select stakes that guarantee a sure loss (Dutch book) for the individual whatever the eventual outcome. This simple principle implies the usual axioms of probability except that the additivity of probability for unions of disjoint events is required to hold only for finite unions. 3 There are numerous axiomatic formulations leading to the central unifying Bayesian prescription of maximizing expected subjective utility as the guiding principle of Bayesian statistical analysis. Bernardo and Smith (1994, Chapter 2) is a valuable introduction to this vast literature. 4 For evidence of the use of subjectivity by history's most illustrious scientists, see Press and Tanur (2001) .
which a researcher may have intuition. 5 The links between exchangeable beliefs over uncertain observables and the parameters in statistical models are provided by various generalizations of de Finettis celebrated Representation Theorem for infinite sequences of exchangeable Bernoulli random variables [Bernardo and Smith (1994, Chapter 4) ]. 6 These theorems provide conditions under which exchangeability, and other symmetries, give rise to an isomorphic world consisting of i.i.d.
observations conditional on a mathematical construct (a parameter), and guarantees the existence of a prior distribution. 7 De Finetti put parameters in their proper perspective: (i) they are mathematical constructs that provide a convenient index for a family of probability distributions, and
(ii) they induce conditional independence in sequences of observables.
Bayesian inference involves updating of prior beliefs into posterior beliefs conditional on observed data. Appealingly, Bayesian analysis requires only a few general principles that are applied over and over again in different settings. Bayesians begin by specifying a joint distribution of all quantities under consideration except known constants. The Bayesian paradigm reduces statistical inference to applied probability. Quantities that become known under sampling (data) are denoted by the
T -dimensional vector y ∈ Y and the remaining unknown (and unobserved) quantities (parameters)
by the K-dimensional vector θ ∈ Θ ⊆ K . Unless noted otherwise, we treat y and θ as continuous random variables. Working in terms of densities, consider f (y, θ) = f (θ)f (y|θ) = f (θ|y)f (y), y, θ ∈ Y × Θ,
where f (θ) is the prior density, f (y|θ), viewed as a function of θ for known y is the likelihood function [denoted L(θ; y)], f (θ|y) is the posterior density and
is the marginal density of the observed data y. From (1) Bayes Theorem for densities follows:
We adopt (3) as the way we update our beliefs when y = y is observed. 8 The choice of prior and likelihood are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. Fortunately, sometimes the integration in (2) 5 Exchangeability provides an operational meaning to the weakest possible notion of a sequence of "similar" random quantities. It is operational because it only requires probability assignments of observable quantities, although admittedly this becomes problematic in the case of infinite exchangeability. 6 As in i.i.d. sequences, the individual elements in an exchangeable sequence are identically distributed, but they are not necessarily independent, which has important predictive implications for learning from experience.
7 Bernardo (2003) notes: "To ignore this mathematical fact, and to proceed as if a prior distribution did not exist, just because it is not easy to specify, is mathematically similar to working on a differential equation system as if no solution existed, once it has been proven that a solution exists, just because an explicit solution is not easily found."
8 Conditional probability Pr(B|A) is subjunctive-it refers to ex ante beliefs on events not yet decided. We adopt such conditioning as a basic principle. This rules out the possibility that the ex post experience of an event (e.g., a stock market crash) can bring with it more information than originally anticipated in the event.
can be performed analytically and so the updating of prior beliefs in light of the data to obtain the posterior beliefs is straightforward. These situations correspond mostly to cases where L(θ; y) belongs to the exponential family of densities. In these cases the prior density can be chosen so that the posterior density falls within the same elementary family of distributions as the prior.
These prior families are called conjugate families. Conjugate priors are more flexible than they may appear at first since mixtures of conjugate priors are themselves conjugate, although they may be daunting to elicit.
The denominator in (3) serves as an integrating constant. Hence, when considering experiments employing the same prior, and which yield proportional likelihoods for the observed data, identical posteriors will emerge, consistent with the likelihood principle [Berger and Wolpert (1988) ]. Unlike the inherent ex ante perspective of frequentist statistics, which seeks properties of procedures in repeated sampling, posterior density (3) is ex post-it conditions on the observed data y = y, and dispenses with the part of the sample space Y that could have been observed but was not.
In most practical situations not all elements of θ are of interest. Let θ = [β γ ] ∈ B × Γ be partitioned into parameters of interest β and nuisance parameters γ not of direct interest. Nuisance parameters are well-named for frequentists, because dealing with them in a general setting is one of the major problems classical researchers face. In contrasts Bayesians have a universal approach to eliminating nuisance parameters from the problem: they are integrated-out of the posterior density yielding the marginal posterior density for the parameters of interest, i.e.,
Point Estimation
Consider a loss (cost) function C(β, β) for the parameters of interest β, i.e., a nonnegative function satisfying C(β, β) = 0, and which measures the consequences of usingβ when the parameter of interest is equal to β. Both frequentists and Bayesians seek to "minimize" (in some sense) C(β, β), but first it randomness must be eliminated. From the frequentist point of view, β is a degenerate random variable, but C(β, β) is stochastic becauseβ is viewed ex ante as the estimatorβ =β(y) depending on the data y which are random viewed ex ante. An obvious way to circumscribe the randomness of C(β, β) is to focus on its expected value, assuming it exists. Frequentists consider the the risk function (assumed to exist):
where the expectation is taken with respect to the sampling density f (y|β, γ).
In contrast, the Bayesian perspective is entirely ex post, and it seeks a function of the observed data y = y to serve as a point estimate of the parameter of interest β. Unlike the frequentist approach, no role is provided for data that could have been observed, but were not. Since β is unknown, the Bayesian perspective suggests formulation of subjective beliefs about it, given all the information at hand. Such information is fully contained in marginal posterior density (4) . In contrast to (5),
Bayesians focus on expected posterior loss:
The second Bayesian commandment (after Bayes Theorem), which guides most of their statistical activities, is act so as to minimize expected posterior loss, i.e., to find β * where
Posterior expectation (6) removes β from [C(β, β)], yielding a criterion function c(β|y) in (6) unlike risk function (5) , that involves only known quantities. 9 For concreteness, focus on the case of univariate β and consider the following three loss functions in which c, c 1 , c 2 and d are known constants: the quadratic loss function C(β, β) = (β − β) 2 , the asymmetric linear loss function:
and the all-or-nothing loss function over |β − β| ≤ d:
Then it is easy to show that the resulting Bayesian point estimates are the posterior mean, the q th posterior quantile where q = c 1 /(c 1 + c 2 ) and the center of an interval of width 2d having maximum posterior probability (yielding the posterior mode as d → 0), respectively. 10
9 In other words, the frequentist approach emphasizes the sampling distribution y|β, γ, and the Bayesian approach emphasizes the posterior distribution β|y = y. Much of the debate is about the desired conditioning -as are most debates in statistics. 10 When there are more than one parameters of interest the most popular loss function is the weighted squared error generalization of quadratic loss, C(β, β) = (β − β) Q(β − β), where Q is a positive definite matrix, or the all-or nothing loss function in (8) . In these cases, the Bayesian point estimates are again the posterior mean and mode (as d → 0), respectively.
Minimum risk estimators do not exist in general because risk function (5) depends on β and γ, and so an estimator that minimizes (5) will also depend on β and γ. Often extraneous side conditions are imposed (e.g., unbiasedness) to side-step the problem. By construction Bayesian point estimates are optimal from the ex post standpoint. In general they also have good ex ante risk properties.
In other words consider the solution to (6) viewed from the ex ante standpoint before the data are realized, i.e., consider the Bayesian point estimatorβ =β(y) . Provided the prior is proper (it integrates to unity), thenβ(y) satisfies the minimal frequentist requirement of admissibility (its risk cannot be dominated by another estimator everywhere in the parameter space). Furthermore, in most interesting settings, Wald (1950) showed that all admissible estimators are either Bayes or limits thereof known as generalized Bayes estimators based on an improper prior whose integral is unbounded (see Section 6). In short, Bayes estimators based on proper priors have desirable properties in terms of final precision by construction, and also have many desirable initial precision properties.
Interval Estimation
Bayesian interval estimation follows directly from the posterior density f (β|y). Because opinions about the unknown parameter are treated in a probabilistic manner, there is no need to introduce the additional concept of "confidence." For example, given a region B † ⊂ B, it is meaningful to ask: given the data, what is the probability that β lies in B † ? The answer is direct:
Alternatively, given a desired probability of content 1 − α, it is possible to reverse this procedure and find a corresponding region B † . The "smallest" region B † satisfying (12) , known as the highest posterior density (HPD) region of content 1 − α for β corresponds to imposing the added condition that for all
Hypothesis Testing
Consider a partition of the parameter space B for the parameter of interest β according to B = From the Bayesian perspective a hypothesis is of interest only if the prior distribution assigns it positive probability. Therefore, assume π j = Pr(H j ) = Pr(β ∈ B j ) > 0, j = 1, 2 with π 1 + π 2 = 1.
The prior probability function (density / mass function) can be decomposed as
where f (β, γ|H j ) is the prior under H j , j = 1, 2. Under H j the marginal data density is
From Bayes Theorem it follows immediately that the posterior probability of H j is
where the unconditional marginal density of the data is f (y) = π 1 f (y|H 1 ) + π 2 f (y|H 2 ). Clearly
Under H j , the posterior density of β and γ is (according to Bayes Theorem):
Using posterior probabilities (12) , the marginal posterior of θ (where
where 
The quantities π 2 /π 1 and π 2 /π 1 are the prior odds and posterior odds, respectively, of H 2 versus H 1 . From (12) it follows immediately that these two odds are related by
In general, expected posterior loss c(d|y, H j ) depends on the data y, and hence, Bayes factor B 21
does not serve as complete data summary because the right hand side of the inequality in (17) also depends on the data. One exception is when both hypotheses are simple. Another is when an all-or-nothing loss is used such that the loss (17) reduces to
The right hand side of the inequality in (18) is a known constant Bayesian critical value.
Prediction
The sampling distribution of an out-of-sample y * ∈ Y * (possibly a vector) given y = y and θ = [β γ ] would be an acceptable predictive distribution if θ was known. However, without knowledge of θ this can not be used. In its place is the Bayesian predictive density 12
Given predictive density (19) , point and interval prediction proceeds analogous to sections 2 and 3.
For example, letting C(ŷ * , y * ) denote a predictive cost (loss) function measuring the performance of a predictorŷ * of y * , the optimal point predictorỹ * is defined to beỹ * = argmin
For example, if y * is a scalar and predictive loss is quadratic, C(ŷ * , y * ) = (ŷ * − y * ) 2 , then the optimal point estimate is the predictive meanỹ * = Y * y * f (y * |y) dy * .
Predictive density (19) treats all parameters as nuisance parameters and integrates them out of the predictive problem. A similar strategy is used when adding parametric hypotheses to the analysis as in section 4. Consider the hypotheses H j j = 1, 2 about θ = [β γ ] and associated priors f (β, γ|H j ), j = 1, 2. Given data y leading to the posterior f (β, γ|y, H j ) the j th conditional predictive density of y * is
Using the posterior probabilities (12), the marginal predictive density of y * is the mixture density
and it serves as the new basis for interval and point prediction. For example, under quadratic loss the optimal Bayesian point estimate is the predictive mean
which is a weighted average of the optimal point forecasts E(y * |y, H j ) under each hypothesis. The weights π j in (22) have an intuitive appeal: the forecasts of more probably hypotheses a posteriori receive more weight.
Choice of Prior
Critics of Bayesianism find the choice of prior is the major stumbling block in adopting the Bayesian approach. In contrast, proponents see the required effort to be manageable and well worth it.
Usually the likelihood is parameterized to facilitate thinking in terms of θ, and so subject matter considerations should suggest plausible values of θ. Even when such direct thinking about θ is possible, we recommend also thinking predictively about the observable y and using (4) to back out a parametric prior f (θ|λ) for a specific value of the hyperparameter λ ∈ Λ for some space Λ [e.g., see Kadane and Wolfson (1998) ]. 13 This ideal, however, is difficult to achieve.
Public research involving only a single prior is likely to draw few readers. Entertaining various professional positions in terms of θ can lead to other choices of λ. Repeating the analysis of Sections 2-5 for these different priors, the sensitivity of the posterior analysis to prior choice can be examined in whatever metric of interest. This is easier said then done, but in principle it can be 13 Usually such analyses restrict attention to conjugate priors. Why should prior beliefs conform to the conjugate prior form? One reason is that natural conjugate priors have an interpretation in terms of a prior fictitious sample from the same process that gives rise to the likelihood function. This corresponds to organizing prior beliefs by viewing the observable world through the same parametric window used for viewing the data.
done. There is a certain element of art involved in communicating a sensitivity analysis to readers.
For large dimensional θ, this can be difficult. Particularly in high-dimensional problems, the effects of the prior can be subtle: it may have little posterior influence on some functions of the data and have an overwhelming influence on other functions.
In other words, rather than thinking of eliciting the prior, it is more useful to think in terms of a set F = {f (θ|λ), λ ∈ Λ} of parametric priors indexed by a hyperparameter λ taking on values in some set Λ. If a prior f (λ) is available for λ, then we are back in the single prior case with the
In most practical problems, however, there will be no agreed upon f (λ), and we are left with investigating the sensitivity of the analyses in Sections 2-5 to different elements in F.
In other cases Λ may be viewed not as a discrete set, but rather as a subspace of Euclidean space. For example, let f (θ|λ) = φ k (θ|0 k , λ), a K-dimensional normal density with mean zero and covariance matrix λ where λ lies in the space Λ corresponding to positive definite covariance matrices of the given dimension. Often a quantity of interest like a posterior mean E(θ|y) can be analytically restricted to a bounded set of values for any λ ∈ Λ. The extreme bounds analysis developed by Ed Leamer is a leading example. In contrast, empirical Bayes analysis proceeds by using the data to estimate λ. Kass and Wasserman (1996) survey formal rules that have been suggested for choosing a prior.
Many of these rules reflect the desire to let the "data speak for themselves." This has led to variety of priors with names like conventional, default, diffuse, flat, formal, generic, indifference, neutral, non-informative, objective, reference, and vague priors. We adopt the encompassing term: nonsubjective priors. These priors are intended to lead to proper posteriors dominated by the data.
They also serve as benchmarks for posteriors derived from ideal subjective considerations. At first many of these priors were also motivated on simplicity grounds. But as problems were discovered, and other issues were seen to be relevant, derivation of such priors became more complicated, possibly even more so than a legitimate attempt to elicit an actual subjective prior.
One interpretation of letting the data speak for themselves is to use classical techniques. 
is the information matrix of the sample. This prior has the desirable feature that if the model is reparameterized by a one-to-one transformation, say α = h(θ), then choosing the non-informative
will lead to identical posterior inferences as using f (θ). Such priors are said to follow Jeffreys'
Rule. 14 There is a fair amount of agreement that such priors may be reasonable in one-parameter problems, but substantially less agreement (including Jeffreys) in multiple parameter problems.
Usually, Jeffreys Rule and other formal rules surveyed by Kass and Wasserman (1996) , lead to improper priors, i.e., priors which integrate to infinity rather than unity (as a proper prior would).
When blindly plugged into Bayes Theorem as a prior they can lead to proper posterior densities, but not always. Furthermore, improper priors, in contrast to proper priors, are not guaranteed to lead to admissible Bayesian point estimators, and marginalization paradoxes can occur. 15 Bernardo (1979) suggested a method for constructing reference priors, offering two innovations.
First, he defined a notion of missing information in terms of the Kullbach-Leibler distance between the posterior and the prior density. Second, he developed a stepwise procedure for handling nuisance parameters. If there are no nuisance parameters, then his method usually leads to Jeffreys Rule.
14 Not all of Jeffreys recommendations followed Jeffreys' Rule. When Θ is finite, Jeffreys assigned equal probabilities to each of the values. When Θ is a bounded interval, Jeffreys assumed a constant proper prior. When Θ = , Jeffreys assumed a constant improper prior. When Θ = [0, ∞), Jeffreys chose f (θ) = 1/θ because it is invariant under power transformations. When θ = [θ1, θ2] where θ1 is a location parameter and θ2 is a non-location parameter, Jeffreys chose f (θ) ∝ |J(θ)| 1/2 , where J(θ) is calculated holding θ 1 fixed. In the case of mixture models, Jeffreys argued that the mixing parameters should be treated independently from the other parameters. 15 As Bernardo (1997) notes, marginalization paradoxes imply that the concept of a unique non-subjective prior is untenable: we may only hope to agree on a unique non-subjective prior for each quantity of interest. For example, consider the standardized mean β = µ/σ of a N (µ, σ 2 ) distribution. Stone and Dawid (1972) showed that the posterior distribution of β only depends on the data through some statistics b, whose sampling distributions only depend on β. It seems reasonable to expect inferences derived from the model f (b|β) would match those obtained from the full model N (µ, σ 2 ). However, this is not possible if the standard non-subjective prior f (µ, σ −2 ) ∝ σ 2 is used. Marginalization paradoxes are ubiquitous in multiparameter problems. Note, however, such problems disappear if a proper prior is used.
Subsequently, numerous refinements have been made in joint work with James O. Berger. A cottage industry has sprung up for generating reference priors in a variety of situations.
There are many candidates for non-subjective priors. One problem is that there are too many candidates! Even in the simple Bernoulli case there are four legitimate candidates [see Geisser(1984) ].
Another problem is that they often have properties that seem rather non-Bayesian. Most nonsubjective priors depend on some or all of the following: (a) the form of the likelihood, (b) the sample size, (c) an expectation with respect to the sampling distribution, (d) the parameters of interest, and (e) whether the researcher is engaging in estimating, testing or predicting. The dependency in (c) of Jeffreys prior on a sampling theory expectation makes it sensitive to a host of problems related to the Likelihood Principle. In light of (d), a non-subjective prior can depend on subjective choices such as which are the parameters of interest and which are nuisance parameters. Different quantities of interest require different non-subjective priors which cannot be combined in a coherent manner.
Improper priors cause more problems in hypothesis testing and model selection than in estimation or in prediction. The reason is that improper priors involve arbitrary constants which are not restricted by the necessity of the prior to integrate to unity. Although these constants cancel when computing the posterior density, Bayes factors involve a ratio of arbitrary constants. This gives rise to questions such as: What does it mean to be equally non-informative in spaces of different dimension? Side-stepping such annoying questions, researchers have explored other non-subjective approaches to hypothesis testing. One idea [Berger and Pericchi (1996) ] is to use enough data to update an improper prior into a proper posterior, and then use the latter to compute a Bayes factor using the remaining data. Of course, there are many such potential training samples. So, try all possible ways and then somehow combine (arithmetic or geometric average?) the different Bayes factors. Amazingly, sometimes this results in a legitimate Bayes factor corresponding to a proper prior called the intrinsic prior.
Our advice is use a noninformative prior only with great care, and never alone. We include nonsubjective priors in the class of priors over which we perform a sensitivity analysis. 16 16 One reaction to choice of prior is to not make one, and proceed with an asymptotic analysis. The same way sampling distributions of MLEs in regular situations are asymptotically normal, posterior density (5) can be approximated as the sample size T approaches infinity by φK (θ|θML, [JT (·)] −1 ), whereθML is the ML estimate and JT (·) is the information matrix. This approximation does not depend on the prior. As an approximation to the posterior density of θ, the approximation usually improves by replacing the information matrix by the observed Hessian of the log-likelihood evaluated atθML. The quality of this approximation can usually be improved by incorporating some In choosing the window L(θ; y) the researcher is torn in two directions: choosing the dimensionality of θ to be large increases the chances of getting a bevy of researchers to agree to disagree in terms of the appropriate priors for θ, but a large dimensional θ necessitate increasingly more informative priors if anything useful is to be learned from a finite sample. 18 We seek a window that is sophisticatedly simple, to borrow a phrase from Arnold Zellner. 19 Diagnostic checking of the maintained initial window can help achieve agreement on the initial window. If the diagnostic checks indicate window expansion, then rethinking is required, a new window must be introduced, and the diagnostic checking process repeated. The extent of diagnostic testing depends in part on the size of the initial window. Everything else being equal, small windows require more checking to convince others of their value than large windows. Reporting that the initial window passes diagnostic checks is intended to soothe the concerns of members of the research community. Due to space limitations we leave detailed discussion of diagnostic checking to others 17 Poirier (1988) introduced the metaphor window for a likelihood function because it captures its essential role: a parametric medium for viewing the observable world. 18 In one sense this dichotomy between prior and likelihood is tautological: if there is no agreement, then the likelihood can always be expanded until agreement is obtained. The resulting window, however, may be hopelessly complex. The "bite" in the statement comes from the assertion that a research believes agreement is compelling in the case of a particular window.
Conscientious empirical researchers provide their readers a variety of ways of looking at the data.
This amounts to checking how the observed data fit marginal density (4), how out-of-sample observables fit predictive density (19) , and how posterior density (14) is summarized and interpreted.
This task is complicated when the dimension K of θ is large or when many hypotheses are entertained. Furthermore, the question arises: How should we bring together the results? Is one hypothesis to be chosen after an enlightened search of the data? If so, then the question is how to properly express uncertainty that reflects both sampling uncertainty from estimating the unknown parameters under a hypothesis and uncertainty over the hypothesis itself. The common practice of choosing a single hypothesis, and then proceeding conditionally on it, is difficult to rationalize because the researchers uncertainty is understated unless that hypothesis has a posterior probability near unity. Readers are interested in a clear articulation of the researcher's uncertainty because it can serve as a useful gauge or reference point for their own uncertainty.
When considering two hypotheses H 1 and H 2 it is possible to assign only π 1 + π 2 = 1 − prior probability to them, and to reserve , where 0 < < 1 probability for an unspecified H 3 representing "something else." Then interpreting π j relatively as Pr(H j |H 1 or H 2 ), posterior probabilities (12) can be computed and also interpreted relatively as Pr(H j |H 1 or H 2 ) without specifying . If in the process the researchers creative mind has a new insight leading to specification of "something else," then some fraction π 3 of 1 − can be allocated to H 3 and the process repeated with the remaining portion allocated to a another unspecified H 4 . The catch here is that H 3 is data-instigated (i.e., created after looking at the data), and the appropriate choice of a "post-data prior" possibly involving π 3 and any parameters unrestricted under H 3 . However, the need for sensitivity analysis in public research implies the researcher is left with the usual task of presenting a variety of mappings from "interesting" priors to posteriors. It is left to the reader to decide whether the priors are sufficiently plausible to warrant serious consideration of the data instigated hypothesis.
Priors that have been contaminated by data can be presented as such -as always it remains for the reader to assess their plausibility.
Computation
Since the early 1990s, the statistics profession (and to a lesser extent the econometrics profession) has seen an explosion in applied Bayesian research. This explosion has had little to do with a warming of the statistics and econometrics communities to the theoretical foundation of Bayesianism, or to a sudden awakening to the merits of the Bayesian approach over frequentist methods, but instead can be primarily explained on pragmatic grounds. The development of powerful computational tools (and the realization that existing statistical tools could prove quite useful for fitting Bayesian models) 20 has drawn a number of researchers to use the Bayesian approach in practice.
Indeed, the use of such tools often enables researchers to estimate complicated statistical models that would be quite difficult, if not virtually impossible, using standard frequentist techniques. The purpose of this section of the paper is to sketch, in very broad terms, basic elements of Bayesian computation. The reader is invited to see Casella and George (1992), Tierney (1994), Gilks et al (1996) , Chib and Greenberg (1995,1996) 
The denominator of the above expression represents the normalizing constant of the joint posterior, since it is only known up to proportionality by Bayes theorem. In virtually all problems of reasonable complexity, the above integration can not be performed analytically, and we take it as given in the remainder of this discussion that no analytical solution for (23) exists.
Non-iterative methods
The first, and perhaps most obvious, way around direct calculation of the integral in (23) 
is a consistent estimator of E[g(θ)|y]. It is useful to note that posterior means, posterior standard deviations, etc. of θ can be obtained in this way given suitable choices for g, and that the accuracy 20 See, e.g., . To this end, a more applicable method is importance sampling, whose use was championed for
Bayesian applications by Kloek and van Dijk (1978) and Geweke (1989) . To provide an intuitive explanation behind the importance sampling estimator, note that the integral equation in (23) can be re-written in the following way: will typically be small for most values of θ i , and thus the sum in (27) will be dominated by a few terms receiving large weight, resulting in a very inaccurate and unstable estimate. Common sense, of course, suggests that the accuracy of an importance sampling estimate will improve as I(θ) more closely approximates the target distribution f (θ|y). Indeed, if I(θ) and f (θ|y) coincide, then the "weights"w(θ) = 1/N , and the estimator in (27) reduces to the ideal case, the direct monte carlo estimator. However, this is an ideal that we can not achieve, as direct sampling from f (θ|y) is typically not possible.
To evaluate the performance of a particular importance sampling estimator, Geweke (1989) suggests a number of diagnostics, including monitoring the weightsw i and calculating relative numerical efficiency (RNE) which quantifies how much is lost (owing to a choice of I(θ) that is far from the target f (θ|y)) by using importance sampling relative to the numerical precision that would have obtained using direct monte carlo integration. Finally, Geweke also introduces conditions required choice is to select something like t 4 (θ;θ,Σ) as an importance function. This choice may offer a reasonable starting point in practice, though application-specific refinements will almost surely offer an improvement in performance. 22 
Iterative Methods
As discussed in the outset of this section, iterative simulation methods, particularly the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis Hastings Algorithm are powerful statistical tools that facilitate computation in a variety of complex models. Though these two algorithms are commonly presented as useful yet distinct instruments for simulating joint posteriors, this distinction is rather artificial -indeed, one can regard the Gibbs sampler as a special case of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm where jumps along the complete conditional distributions are accepted with probability one. In conditionally conjugate models, the Gibbs sampler is typically the algorithm of choice (since the complete pos-terior conditionals are easily sampled), giving the Gibbs sampler particular prominence in a wide array of models, and perhaps creating an artificial distinction between the algorithms. In our discussion below we follow this convention and thus discuss these two algorithms separately.
The general strategy with iterative methods is to follow the steps of the algorithms to generate a series of draws (sometimes called a parameter chain), say θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · that converge in distribution to some target density -in our case, the posterior f (θ|y). The algorithms are constructed so that the posterior f (θ|y) is the unique stationary distribution of the parameter chain. Once convergence to the target density is "achieved" we can use these draws in the same way as with direct monte carlo integration to calculate posterior means, posterior standard deviations, etc. In practice, we take care to diagnose that the parameter chain has approached convergence to the target density, 23 to discard the initial set of the pre-convergence draws (often called a burn-in period), and then to use the post-convergence sample to calculate the desired quantities. Unlike the non-iterative methods discussed previously, the post-convergence draws we obtain using these iterative methods will prove to be correlated, as the distribution of, say, θ t depends on the last parameter sampled in the chain,
24 If the correlation among the draws is severe, it may prove to be difficult to traverse the entire parameter space, and the numerical standard errors associated with the point estimates can be quite large. When the simulations are highly correlated, and our chain makes only small local movements from iteration to iteration, we refer to this as slow mixing of the parameter chain.
The Gibbs Sampler
Let θ be a K × 1 parameter vector with associated posterior distribution f (θ|y) and write θ = 25 The Gibbs sampling algorithm proceeds as follows:
. This initial condition could be arbi- 23 There is a large literature devoted to this topic and numerous diagnostics to use. Perhaps the most popular is to run multiple chains from "overdispersed" starting values, watch the progress of the chains for a representative set of parameters, and determine at what point the chains appear to "settle down" to explore the same region of the parameter space. Other possibilities include calculation of the scale reduction factor of Gelman and Rubin (1992), which again analyzes behavior across and within chains, and monitoring the lag autocorrelations and associated numerical standard errors. There are a variety of other diagnostics as well: see (among others) Cowles and Carlin (1996) and Brooks and Gelman (1998) for a review and Geweke (2004) for tests of posterior simulators. If the mixing is slow due to high autocorrelation in the parameter chains, reparameterizations may help to mitigate the problem, or parameters can be blocked together in one simulation step, when possible. 24 Because of this dependence, these algorithms are often referred to as Markov Chain Monte Carlo or MCMC methods. 25 We use superscripts to denote elements of the parameter vector and subscripts to denote iterations in the algorithm.
trarily chosen, sampled from the prior, or perhaps could be obtained from a crude estimation method such as least-squares.
(a) Sample θ 1 1 from the complete posterior conditional density:
, always conditioning on the most recent values of the parameters drawn.
To implement the Gibbs sampler we require the ability to draw from the posterior conditionals of the model. Although the joint posterior density f (θ|y) may often be intractable, the complete conditionals {f (θ j |θ −j , y)} K j=1 , (with θ −j denoting all parameters other than θ j ) prove to be of standard forms in many cases, particularly in hierarchical models and latent variable models using data augmentation 26 
The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
The Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm is an accept-reject type algorithm in which a candidate value, say θ c , is proposed, and then one decides whether to set θ t+1 (the next value of the chain) equal to θ c or to remain at the current value of the chain, θ t . Formally, let P (θ|θ t ) be an approximating proposal density (where the potential dependence on the current value of the chain is made explicit), 27 and consider generating samples from P (θ|θ t ) instead of the target distribution f (θ|y). 26 In data augmentation, one samples from the complete or augmented posterior density which includes both the parameters and the augmented data. Although this would seem to complicate the estimation exercise, the added conditioning on latent data often makes sampling from the conditional distribution of the model parameters straightforward. 27 The last value of the chain θ t does not have to affect the sampling from the proposal density. If this dependence is suppressed, P (θ|θ t ) = P (θ) and the resulting chain is termed an independence chain. Such a chain would arise if one were to choose a tailored proposal density that calculated, say the posterior mode and posterior covariance matrix and then used these to center and scale the proposal density. If, e.g., θ|θ t ∼ N (θ t , Σ) for given Σ, the chain is termed a random walk chain.
Supposing that θ c is sampled from P (·|θ t ), we will then set θ t+1 = θ c with (M-H) probability 28
and otherwise set θ t+1 = θ t . In the case of a symmetric proposal density (the original Metropolis algorithm), the above probability of acceptance reduces to f (θ c |y)/f (θ t |y), whence candidate draws from regions of higher density are always accepted in the algorithm, and draws from regions of lower density are occasionally accepted.
Often the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithms are used in combination in a given application. For example, it might be the case that the complete conditionals for K − 1 of the elements of θ have convenient functional forms, whence the Gibbs sampler can be used to sample from these K − 1 posterior conditionals. The complete conditional for the remaining parameter, however, may not take a standard form, and for this parameter, one could use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate samples. This type of sampling is often referred to as a "Metropolis-within-Gibbs" step, and in (partially) non-conjugate situations, the use of both algorithms in combination often proves to be computationally attractive. We provide an example of such sampling in the following section.
Empirical Example
In this section we provide a straight-forward empirical example to illustrate the mechanics of posterior simulation. We choose an application which illustrates how the Gibbs sampler and MetropolisHastings algorithms are used to fit an econometric model and involves diagnosing convergence and possibly accelerating convergence through reparameterization. Finally, prediction and model selection (testing) using marginal likelihoods are also discussed in the context of our example.
Our particular application uses a portion of the data set provided by Butler et al (1998) to investigate how mathematics SAT scores influence the number of semesters of calculus courses taken in college. The data were gathered from students at Vanderbilt University, and ultimately, the authors were interested in determining the "causal" effect of mathematics preparation on grades in intermediate-level theory courses in economics. In this illustrative application, however, we use this data to simply to explore the relationship between SAT performance and semesters of college-level calculus taken prior to intermediate-level courses in economic theory.
The Model
Our analysis divides the types of calculus courses students could possibly take into four categories:
the least rigorous option: a one-semester calculus "survey" course, one semester of calculus, 29 two semesters of calculus, and more than two semesters of calculus. The choices are obviously ordered, leading us to consider adopting an ordered probit specification for our analysis:
and
where ( For the parameters of the model, β and α = [α 2 α 3 ], we employ independent priors of the form
with V β denoting the prior covariance matrix and φ(x; µ, Σ) denoting a Normal density for x with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. In practice, we make the relatively vague choice of V β = 100I K , with I K denoting the K × K identity matrix, so that the prior information will be quite small relative to information contained in the data. 29 The authors actually differentiate even further, and separate semesters into what might be called "standard" calculus courses and more rigorous calculus for math majors courses. We do not make such a distinction here and group these into one category. 30 A satisfactory score on the College Board Foreign Language Achievement Test implied that the student did not have to meet a foreign language requirement at Vanderbilt. Since Vanderbilt's foreign language requirement could be met by taking higher level math courses, presumably those meeting the foreign language requirement would take less math courses, on average.
Fitting the Model
To facilitate computation, we choose to work with the augmented posterior distribution, 31 where the latent data {z i } n i=1 are included as elements in the joint posterior density.
where I(·) denotes the standard indicator function. The last line follows from the assumed conditional independence across observations, and notes that the distribution of y i is degenerate given the latent data z and cutpoints α.
The standard Gibbs sampler would proceed by deriving and iteratively sampling from the three posterior conditionals: f (z|α, β, y), f (α|z, β, y) and f (β|α, z, y). However, it has been noted that this standard Gibbs sampler in the ordered probit suffers from slow mixing, primarily due to high degrees of correlation between the simulated latent data z and cutpoints α. 32 To this end, we introduce a reparameterization 33 and blocking step which helps to mitigate this high degree of correlation. Specifically, we let
and seek to work with the posterior distribution p(α * 2 , β * , δ 2 , z * |y). In the case of a three choice ordered probit model, this parameterization eliminates all the unknown cutpoints of the model, and δ 2 resembles a variance parameter from a linear regression model. In general, this reparameterization reduces the correlation between z and α and improves the performance of our sampler.
Noting that the Jacobian of this transformation is [
To fit this model we will employ the iterative simulation methods of the previous section, and specifically, we will successively sample from the following posterior conditionals: 
where T N (a,b) (µ, σ 2 ) denotes a Normal density with mean µ and variance σ 2 truncated to the interval (a, b).
The posterior simulator is implemented by sampling from (34), (36) , (37) , and (38) , conditioning at each step on the most recent set of parameters drawn. To recover the original coefficient vector β and cutpoints α 2 and α 3 , we simply use the inverse transformations β = (1/δ)β * , α 3 = (1/δ) and α 2 = α * 2 /δ at each iteration of the sampler. 
Diagnostics and Estimation Results

Lag Correl ati on
We fit the model by drawing from the conditionals above for 5,000 iterations, discarding the first 500 draws as the burn-in period. Standard diagnostics (e.g., running multiple chains from overdispersed starting values) suggested that the parameter chains mixed well and converged reasonably quickly.
As suggestive evidence of this, in Figure 1 we present a plot of lagged autocorrelations for the parameter that seemed to exhibit the highest degree of autocorrelation, α 3 . As evident from this figure, even this parameter mixes quite well-taking every fifth or sixth draw from the parameter chain, for example, would result in a nearly independent sample of draws from the posterior.
In Table 1 below we present posterior means, standard deviations and probabilities of being positive 37 for the parameters and cutpoints (α 2 and α 3 ) in our model. As one can see from the table, we find strong evidence that mathematics SAT scores play an important role in the level of calculus attained, and there is little evidence that satisfying the foreign language requirement at Varnderbilt reduces the number of calculus courses taken-in fact, there is modest evidence in this model that those satisfying the foreign language requirement actually take more calculus courses. 
Testing
As discussed in section 4, Bayes factors, defined as the ratio of marginal likelihoods between two competing models, can be used to test both nested and non-nested hypotheses. Specifically, under equal prior odds between two models M 1 and M 2 , the Bayes factor B 12 gives the posterior odds in favor of model 1 relative to model 2.
In the context of our application, let us entertain the hypothesis that the coefficient on mathematics SAT scores, say β SAT , equals 0 so that mathematics SAT scores play no role in predicting the number of calculus courses taken in college. As suggested by Table 1 , this assertion seems greatly at odds with our data, yet we still wish to conduct a test to investigate this claim. To formally carry out such a test, let M 2 be the unrestricted version of our model, as estimated in the previous section, and let M 1 be the model imposing the restriction β SAT = 0. As shown in Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) , in this case 38 the Bayes factor B 12 reduces to:
the ratio of the ordinates of the marginal posterior for β SAT at 0 to the prior for β SAT at 0 under the unrestricted Model 2.
In practice, the above expression is typically easy to compute. The denominator can usually be calculated trivially, as one only has to evaluate the (marginal) prior at a particular point. The numerator can be calculated in several different ways using simulated output from the posterior.
First, and most efficiently, one can use "Rao-Blackwellization" [e.g., ] to calculate the desired ordinate. Formally, let γ denote all of the other parameters of our model.
where γ i represents the i th draw from the posterior of the remaining model parameters. The conditional distribution f (β|γ, y, M 2 ) is known when using the Gibbs sampler, and thus ordinates of this conditional at 0 can often be easily obtained.
Secondly (and more generally in low dimension problems), one could use kernel density estimation 39 to estimate the desired ordinate at 0:
with β i SAT representing the i th draw from the marginal posterior distribution of β SAT , K is a kernel function (typically, a mean-zero, symmetric density function) and h is a bandwidth or smoothing parameter.
When implementing the above test we calculate B 12 as approximately 2.0 × 10 −83 so that the unrestricted Model 2 is favored over the restricted Model 1 by the enormous factor of 5.0 × 10 82 ! This overwhelming preference makes sense given the concentration of β SAT on positive regions away from zero (as suggested in Table 1 ) and provides convincing evidence that mathematics SAT scores are important predictors of the number of calculus courses taken in college. 38 This holds if the prior for the remaining parameters in Model 1 is the same as the prior for those parameters in Model 2 given that β SAT = 0. Typically, it is sensible use the same priors for parameters that are common to both models. 39 See, e.g., Silverman (1986) for more on nonparametric density estimation.
Prediction
To get a better sense of how SAT scores affect the number of calculus courses taken, we will make predictions about the probabilities associated with each level of calculus, given SAT scores and other covariates in the model. To be a bit more formal, let y f denote the as-yet unobserved quantity of calculus taken for some future, out-of-sample individual and note from our maintained model:
with SAT denoting the mathematics SAT score, FL denoting the foreign language dummy and
x f generically capturing all future covariates. Above we have used the notation g j (α, β|x f , y) as we regard the conditional probability in (39) as a function of the model parameters α and β for given values of the covariates x f . The added conditioning on y reflects that we will make posterior probability statements about this function of the parameters.
In Figure 2 From Figure 2 we see a wealth of information which generally agrees with our prior expectations.
Students with low math SAT scores are likely to take the least rigorous calculus survey course, and are very unlikely to take more than 2 semesters of calculus prior to taking intermediate microeconomic theory. Conversely, those with very high math SAT's are likely to take more than two semesters of calculus and are unlikely to take only the calculus survey prior to intermediate-level courses in economic theory. Regardless of SAT score, students are not likely to take only one semester of calculus, and two semesters of calculus seems to be the most likely choice for those students not in either tail of the mathematics SAT distribution. 
Discussion and Recommendations for Further Reading
